an rather interesting piece on kashmir by Peter Chalk and Chris Fair of the Rand Corporation.

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Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has figured
prominently in Washington's global war on terrorism. Responding to a series
of threats and inducements, President General Pervez Musharraf terminated
support for the fundamentalist Taliban regime it had helped create and
foster in Kabul, allowed Pakistani territory and airspace to be used for
Operation Enduring Freedom, and provided important intelligence data to
coalition forces targeting terrorist training camps on Afghan soil.

Pakistan is expected to play a continuing role in Bush's plans to tackle
remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda elements, both on account of its
geostrategic position in Southwest Asia and the fact that the best
information on these entities currently lies with Islamabad's own
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.

In his recent trip to the United States (September 2002), Musharraf
reiterated his commitment to the war on terrorism and preparedness to
cooperate with the international community in rooting out and destroying
extremist Islamist elements. One area, however, where the president
remained noticeably quiet - and where the US has been conspicuously
reticent in terms of pressuring his regime - is the issue of jihadi
terrorism connected to the disputed Indian-administered province of Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K).

In two widely hailed speeches delivered on January 12 and May 27 this year,
Musharraf variously pledged that all militant infiltration across the Line
of Control (LoC) would end and that there would be no tolerance of
organizations that openly espouse and propagate extremist sentiments. In
addition, he announced the banning of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) - the three
jihadi outfits at the forefront of terrorist activity in J&K - and moved to
arrest several hundred militants scattered across the country.

Despite these commitments, infiltration across the LoC is presently close
to levels seen this time last year; the leaders of both the LeT and the JeM
remain essentially free to conduct their activities in an unhindered
fashion in Pakistan; asset seizures of proscribed groups have so far netted
no more than a few hundred dollars in most cases; and the bulk of the
militants arrested during the first six months of 2002 have since been
released.

Violence levels in J&K also continue to rise, with both the LeT and the JeM
moving to disrupt the state elections in September-October that ended this
week by systematically targeting candidates (two candidates - Sheikh Abdul
Rahman from the Handwara constituency of northern Kupwara district and Law
Minister and National Conference (NC) candidate from Lolab constituency
Mushtaq Ahmed Lone have been killed thus far), political workers (84 had
already been killed by October 4]) and party rallies. State government
officials have also been attacked, with a particularly serious incident
occurring on September 11 when the J&K Law and Parliamentary Affairs
Minister, Mustaq Ahmed Lone, was assassinated.

In short, extremist Islamist activity and terrorism in J&K is as prominent
as ever - the inspirational and organizational source of which clearly
remains rooted in Pakistan.

To date, the United States has chosen not to forcibly pressure Islamabad on
demonstrably curbing militancy connected to the Kashmir dispute. Although
officials in Washington note that Musharraf is being privately encouraged
to abandon his strategy, they concede that there has been no move to
strongly demarche him over the issue since September 2001, when the global
war on terrorism was first instituted. Indeed, American strategy in the
region increasingly appears to be following a two-tier tract, giving
precedence to operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, while
conspicuously delaying firm action to permanently neutralize Kashmiri
militant activity in and from Pakistan. Given president George W Bush's
post-September 11 affirmation that "'you are either with us or against us"
in the war on terrorism, and that there will be no tolerance for those that
willingly eschew the effort against international extremism, Washington's
reticence is deserving of some explanation.

Undoubtedly the key consideration underlying US policy is the belief that
Kashmir is simply not an issue that Musharraf can move decisively on. Not
only does the liberation of the state from "repressive" Indian rule
constitute the essential raison d'etre for the army (not to mention the
crucial justification for the inordinately large percentage of the
country's GDP that the military consumes), it is also something that many
Pakistanis have been brought up to believe constitutes the "marrow" of
national patriotism. Add to this the existence of several thousand armed
jihadis who could just as easily direct their energies against Islamabad as
New Delhi, and an understanding of Washington's perspective begins to
emerge: pushing Musharraf too forcibly on Kashmir risks fatally undermining
a key ally in the war on terrorism and possibly setting up a chain of
events that leads to the institution of a more divided, if not extreme
regime in Pakistan.

How viable and wise, however, is the US position? Ignoring the Kashmir
dispute certainly risks undercutting Washington's relations with India -
the key hegemonic power on the sub-continent and a state that already views
Bush's war on terrorism as one specifically geared toward narrow American
strategic and national interests. As several intelligence analysts remarked
to these two authors, "Why does the US continually ask us about Pakistan's
involvement with terrorism and yet never do anything about it?"

Arguably of more importance is the danger of allowing the emergence of a
new "hotbed" of pan-Islamic extremism for the sake of short term
expediencies. It should be remembered that the groups at the apex of the
conflict in Kashmir - the LeT and the JeM - have always articulated their
objectives in a wider transnational context, with the rhetorical enemy
defined as any state that is perceived to be at odds with their own
idiosyncratic Wahhabist-based ideological interpretation of the world. More
to the point, both of these organizations are known to have forged tactical
and personal linkages with al-Qaeda and may now be moving to facilitate the
logistical relocation of Osama bin Laden's forces, post-Taliban. Securing a
stable, moderate and functional state in Pakistan will be key not only to
stabilizing Afghanistan, India and the general Southwest Asian region but,
more intrinsically, to mitigating the export of the type of unrestrained
extremism that culminated in the September 11 tragedy.

There are also ethical reasons as to why the United States should make
every effort to rehabilitate and "de-jihadize" Pakistan. It is often
forgotten that many of the country's current internal security problems and
seeming dependence on Islamist manpower stem from America's own policy of
exhorting and propagating the international anti-Soviet mujahideen campaign
in Afghanistan. When Washington departed from the region in 1989, it left a
vast underground network for the trafficking of drugs and arms - which have
created huge law and order problems for successive governments in Islamabad
- as well as an extremely sophisticated militant training infrastructure
that has been effectively mobilized for the proxy war in Kashmir.

Rehabilitating Pakistan is, thus, not only a question of national security,
it is also morally incumbent given the US's close association with
fostering instability in this part of Asia. Perhaps the most viable ally
the Bush administration has in furthering this effort is the Pakistani
population itself, which overwhelmingly supports a return to the moderate
path envisioned by the republic's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

It is essential that the US take these considerations into account in the
current formulation of its policy toward Musharraf. Not doing so is to risk
the emergence of a terrorist operational environment in Pakistan's remote
northern regions that could prove every bit as threatening as the Afghan
conduit that preceded it.

Peter Chalk, senior political analyst, Rand Corporation and Chris Fair,
associate political scientist, Rand Corporation